Political Philosophy of India was on complete disarmament and world free from Nuclear weapons. Gandhian philosophy of nonviolence, mutual cooperation and truthfulness could not sustain immediately after the Great Theocentric divide and partition. The Violence and bloodshed that started with a new revived phase on 16 August 1946 continued with October attack on Kashmir by the newly born Pakistan. Soon the Chinese incursions set a new security concern. The Government led by Jawaharlal Nehru relied on friendship and deposed trust in the Chinese leadership under Chou en Lai that territorial violations would not escalate. India refused accept that china waged a war with India, instead treated the whole situation as an aggression. However, much against the political notions, from the initial set backs, Indian Army mounted an assault on the invading Chinese contingents , forcing them to flee. Eye witness narratives point towards and the real data huge difference in the official data of casualties on Chinese side. It was an unprecedented shock for the Chinese Communist Party, deciding to withdraw their positions which was evident from the response from the Chinese Government. " Beginning from December 1, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw 20 kilo meters from the line of actual control as on November 7, 1959.". That was a new beginning and a matter of great psychological win fro the Indian Armed Forces.
Today, the ear on India has to be based on skepticism generated from undisclosed Defense technological secrets that will point to a disaster of indefinite proportions for any country. The Country has just displayed the effectiveness of integrating indigenously developed systems with imported ones to create an architecture that had proved its outstanding capabilities in Operation Sindoor. At the same time time immediately before the 1962 invasion of China, the Prime Minister of India showed his reliance to low quality Indian weaponry than importing the weapons from other countries that were useless for them.
The change is visible. as one goes through the political outlook of India in 1962. the debates in the Parliament on Chinese incursions will provide a clear and concise picture,
On 06 December 1961, Braja Kishore Sinha called the attention of the Rajya Sabha on the Chinese incursions into the Indian Territory.
A sizeable area of our territories were lost from within a decade, starting with 12,000 square miles in 1956 that led to several changes in the international borders between 1959 and 1961. Attack on Assam Riles post in Lingju of Arunachal Bhutan Border.in 1950 was not taken up seriously. Lingju was taken over by China and Assam riffles had to withdraw. For the First time, Guns sounded in the India China Border,
Nehru took the stand that the Lingju confrontation as a creation of those who stood for the liberation of Tibet. The Government of India had hidden the information from the people on the Chinese taking away 12000 square miles.
Barely an year before Chinese Communist forces launched a full scale attack deep inside NEFA, the question raised by Pandit Hridyanathh Kurzu in November 1961 in on the area taken away by the Chinese, the Prime Minister holding the Ministry of External Affairs had stated that :
"The exact area is the area of the post. There is no other area. They sit on a post. Now the influence of that post round about is not occupation, but its influence. They do not occupy any other territory, actual occupation. It is just that post, whatever it may be, a few hundred yards or so, but actually a post has certain influence round about. How far round about depends upon many circumstances. It is not occupation; any other area is not occupied."
On the motion of 06 December961, a motion on the Chinese incursions Rajya Sabha the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru replied:.
“… So the point we have been considering is what has appeared in the course of the last year—that is a narrow issue—and if you like in that connection, what our broad policies are. I stated that what has happened in the course of the last year on the Chinese side was, so far as we knew, that three check-posts or military posts had been established. We cannot give the exact date, it is not possible. We can only say that it was not there on one day and later it was there on some other day when our reconnaissance party went there. Or, in other words, we got to know about it then. We heard about it in September—in the 'beginning or middle of September. And so, we mentioned these three posts—one, rather in the north, not far from the Karakoram and not far from an important post that we have— a long name, I forget it at the moment—and their post is on the Chipchop River about fifteen miles to east of our post and two posts in the southern region of northern Ladakh which we mentioned and which we said were round about the international frontier.”.
“….Now, one word about building of roads. An hon. Member has asked why they have built thousands of miles of roads on their side and we have not done so still. The broad answer to that question is that the terrain they have to pass through is far easier to build roads on than the terrain we have on our side. That is to say, there are broad plateaus, ups and downs. Road-making in Tibet, apart from the high mountains that come in, is merely pulling out trees and levelling and nothing else, no application of anything, because the moment it is levelled it is a road. Owing to extreme winter the ground is so hard that nothing more is done. We have ourselves built one airfield at least in these high regions in Ladakh which cost us at that time, I do not know, exactly Rs. 400. Practically nothing. It meant really sweeping the place and removing little boulders and stones and pulling out shrubs and it became an airfield, not a first class one but good enough for use. So that road-making on the other side has been a very much simpler undertaking. Then on our side we have to cross high mountain peaks, passes, up and down precipices. Hon. Members who have cared to see the photographs of some places— even the Himachal Pradesh roads that are being built— will realize the extremely hazardous nature of this road-making. That is one reason. I think we have proceeded fairly well with road making in these mountains. The real difficulty has been that we have to take everything—I mean every machine, every screw has to be taken by air and that led, naturally, to our trying to acquire bigger transport planes, big ones to carry these things. We did that and matters have been progressing fairly well and I can assure Dr. Kunzru that it is not in an attempt to save a few crores of rupees that we have allowed, or we are going to allow, this to suffer.”
” But there is another fact. Apart from any temporary affair, in any major conflict anywhere with any country, our first and basic defence is the industrial position we hold behind it, what we are producing—I am not talking about other things, of war material and the rest but everything—whether it is aircraft, whether it is guns, whether it is other things. That is the basic thing. If one does not have it, one depends on external sources which are not very reliable and not forthcoming at the time. It is better, I have always held—and that has been the opinion of some of the highest military advisers that we get from abroad to advise us—it is better to have second class weapons which you produce yourself and have them in abundance than an improved weapon which you do not produce and which may be denied to you at the time of need and which may get out of order and you cannot put it right and then you are helpless. However, that is a matter of opinion”.
“Anyhow, the basic thing for defence is the Plans. All these Five Year Plans are basic for the defence of India. People seem to think that the Five Year Plans are something isolated from the defence of India. Some people in the other place said, "Oh, scrap the Five Year Plans and go in our defence" which showed how little understanding there is as to what is required for defence. All this is required— may be some odd thing or may not be—but whether we want an iron and steel factory, it is essential for defence. All that defence -wants is steel. So, in building up defence, in building up the strength of India for protecting the security of India, building up this industrial apparatus is highly important. We may give a twist to the industrial apparatus so as to build more of defence. That is another matter. But essentially the things are common whether It is defence, or whether it is any kind of civil advance. So, as I said, in considering the position as it is, arising during the last year this has happened to the best of our know ledge and we consider it as a serious matter, not merely as an intention or intent but as something that has been done-“
"We have meanwhile also put up a number of posts, che»k-posts, military posts. It is not quite proper for me to give the exact locations of them except the one I have mentioned which is right near the Karakoram and which prevents any flanking movement fro« that side. The position is that, when people ask how -much territory they have taken over, committed aggression on—the Chinese —and vaguely they say ten thousand miles, fifteen thousand miles or two thousand miles, it is difficult to say that because it is not occupied in the ordinary sense of the word, although it is true that a certain influence is exercised over a certain territory by these check-posts, and one may say that where there is a succession of check-posts they are, in a sense, in possession of the territory behind them. That is so. On the other hand, there are some check-posts which are like a zigzag. They are check-posts and it cannot be said that they have occupied that territory. I do not wish to make much of the facts. It really does not make very much difference. The point is how much strength they have to control that place because occupation there is not occupation of territory where people live. They are just mountains and other things and in that sense I had said that it was not correct that the building up of one check-post in the north— there is one in the north really, the other is on the frontier—had given them a larger area under occupation, but it has given them a stronger position in that area. That is correct”.
Nehru Chose to spin the matters to another angle. His usual manner of exhibiting his vision on the global security and safety:
“The major problem before us now is whether in the course of two, three, four or five years there is going to be a nuclear war or not. That is the big problem of a war which will destroy everything, which will affect every country, including India, even though we may not be joining any war. And so we have to see this problem in this context, because when we see it in that context, it does make a difference, what China can do to us and what we can do to China. In spite of some people thinking that we are isolated in the world—we may be isolated from the point of view of non-alignment and not being a party to some military alliance—there are other ways of contact, close contacts and close friendships. And apart from any such ways, there are reactions. Is it imaginable that a war between India and China will remain confined to these two countries? It will be a world war and nothing but a world war. I am not saying that it need necessarily be a war between India and China. Other steps can be taken and may have some effect. But we have to think of every aspect, of every possible development and prepare for it, and avoid developments which may be very harmful not only to us but to the world.”
“…I hope, Sir, that the House will agree with this assertion of our position, that this aggression has taken place on our territory and we must do everything in our power to get that aggression vacated. We must try to use every diplomatic and all peaceful devices to that end, whatever they may be, that is to say, avoid war to that purpose, because war between India and China would be one of the major disasters of the world, for us and for the world, for it will mean world war. It will mean war which will be indefinite. We would not be able to limit it in time, because it will not be possible for China to defeat us and it will be impossible for us to march up to Peking across Tibet. These things are not done. Things function differently and for us to jump into such things would be the reverse of wisdom. If it is to be done, if it is forced upon us, it is a different matter. Therefore, we should be prepared and prepare as fast as we can and in the best way we can, keeping in view always the larger situation in the world and how it is developing and how that is affecting our own problems in India”
It requires no interpretation or commentaries.
The long term planning to develop whole infrastructure required for the defense industry and then entering into production of weaponry was the approach. Situations of border areas did not change in even by the 21st century. Yet the present government came out of the age old notions and went on to develop the border areas. The defense sector was freed from the old psyche of confining everything within the fold of government establishments. Private sector took entry and more indigenous investments in capital and ideas making an unprecedented line of combat efficiency abd self dense.
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