As MiG 21 is off the Indian Sky….
New Delhi, a Hot summer day towards the last week of May 1962. The Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru was on the move for holidaying out at his favorite destination-the Vale of Kashmir. Behind the hectic activities to send him off who, a couple of months before had recovered from a health condition, was leaving behind an important decision. India was to take a decision to find an alternative strategic partner other than the United Kingdom for air superiority over communist China and Pakistan. The United States had already delivered a batch of F 104 aircrafts to Pakistan. India had a sizable number of Folland Gnats; yet, the combat preparedness demanded a larger buildup of supersonic aircrafts to deal with the situation. Military operation, a year before carried out in Goa, had turned the North Atlantic Treaty countries against India. Together with a red faced US, was not a favourable political climate for India. Raisina Hills was divided between two strong lobbies of VK Krishna Menon in favour of the Soviet Union and the other a Pro USA lobby led by Morarji Desai.
At the airport, a curious ring of Journalists was awaiting Nehru with the question on the procurement of US aircrafts. Before Jawaharlal Nehru could reply, the Defence Minister, VK Krishna Menon intervened –“ “Remember, this country is free, we have the right to purchase any equipment or arms from anybody we like." The answer did not give enough fodder for the US diplomats to signal anything to the White House. The United States was strongly against the purchase of MiG21 aircrafts from the Soviet Union, which the White House figured out to be against the neutrality India was displaying, keeping equidistance with the key players of the Cold War.
China had already made propaganda on the Indian troops mounting attack fire on their troops. Both NEFA and Ladakh Divisions were under Chinese military buildup. The vacation of Nehru for the second time following his health issues, indeed delayed the decision on the procurement of fighter aircrafts. With this delay, India failed to capitalize the ideological rift between China and the Soviet Union. Despite being committed to NAM, again New Delhi could not take advantage of the US objectives to equip India as a strong ally against Communist China.
Behind the curtains, both VK Krishna Menon and Nehru faced the backlash from the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev who was all out to dismantle the Stalinist policies. He was a close confidant of Joseph Stalin and was well aware of the undercurrents behind the Political transition in Delhi, using a duo from Malabar, the region slipping into the fold of communist lobby, VK Krishna Menon and ACN and Nambiar. Both of them maintained a non-diplomatic channel between Stalin and Nehru. It was well known in the days of Berlin operations that Nambiar was a spy of Nehru on Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose and came into prominence after Indian Legion was dismantled His role in the elimination of Abbanni and Chato during the Great Purge is yet disputed and India will have to believe Vijay Lakshmi Pandit. Khrushchev knew it well that China had taken a very aggressive stand against its neighbours from the incidents of Sino Indian Borders in 1954 and 1958. The exchange of fire had already taken place at a few segments, which New Delhi down played as stray incidents at few outposts, even when 2800 square miles of India was already taken over by China. After Joseph Stalin, New Delhi did not get the same red cover from the Soviets and India was becoming more and more vulnerable to the designs of Mao.
The relationship with Mao and Khrushchev was becoming bitter. At this point of time, together with the Cuban Missile crisis, the delivery of the first squadron of MiG 21 was cancelled. India had to face a crushing defeat in the first phase of the Chinese aggression in NEFA. China consolidated their position in Aksai Chin.
Nehru was caught between Non Alignment and was indecisive on the strategic partnerships between US and Soviet Union, while continuing procurements with France and Britain. Folland Gnat had already been inducted to the service of IAF in 1959. Yet, India was not prepared to face any full scale war with organized armies like the PLA of Communist China.
It seemed as if the Soviet Union opened the doors of a new Strategic partnership. But, India seems to have not read the political considerations behind the decision. Soviet Union decided to support India and agreed to make way for the MiG 21 Aircrafts under liberal conditions, not because of any political affiliation or friendly relationship. The decision was taken to teach Mao a lesson after he took a sharp turn against the decision of Khrushchev for a dialogue with the US President Eisenhower. The USSR was to settle scores with the US to avert a nuclear catastrophe. Mao felt it as a deceptive stand against the aspirations for a communist centric world that would dictate the global politics over the Capitalist and imperial Western Powers.
Khrushchev felt offended at the bloodthirsty mindset of Mao and acted fast calling back all the engineers and staff working on various defence projects in China. In a quick move, he decided to help the countries under the threat of the revanchist designs of China. Khrushchev took note of the widening rift between China and India along borders with Ladakh and NEFA. India was facing an acute shortage of Foreign exchange reserves and was finding it difficult to get into terms with the US. At this juncture, the Soviet Premier made the conditions liberal, agreed to accept payments in Indian Currency and through trade, besides agreeing for indigenous production of the aircrafts. The plans of China for a preemptive strike was already in the knowledge of Leningrad and swiftly entered into agreement in 1961 to supply a squadron of MiG 21 aircrafts to India and the rest for indigenous production.
At any time, India will have to accept that the “Forward Policy” of Nehru failed.
Seemingly, New Delhi was unaware of the rift between Moscow and Peking over Communist dominance. The Chinese Communist Party took stock of the consequences of the event India got equipped with the supersonic aircrafts from the soviets and Zhou en Lai stepped in. He signaled his Diplomats in New Delhi.
Matters went off the track for India faster than expected. The Ministry of External Affairs, perhaps did not find anything unusual in the meetings between Chinese and Soviet Diplomats engaging in frequent exchanges. The negotiations between the Diplomats paid well in resolving the ideological deadlock between the two Communist powers. After the matters were sorted out between the diplomats at New Delhi, Zhou en Lai summoned the Soviet Ambassador to Beijing and gave a description as if the Indian Military intruded into the borders of China, inflicting heavy casualties to the PLA. He then directed his Ambassador in Moscow to meet Khrushchev to cancel the delivery of MiG 21 Aircrafts to India, It has to be understood that following the brief from his envoy in New Delhi, Khrushchev invited the Ambassador of China to Moscow for dinner. This marked the end of the diplomatic deadlock with China, after Khrushchev had deviated from the Stalinist stand against capitalist US and imperialist European countries. The Soviet leader assured Liu Xiao, the Chinese Ambassador, that the Soviet Union fully supported China in their initiative against India.
The Soviets Accepted the Chinese theory that India had attacked the Chinese soldiers and China deserves the right for a preemptive strike on India. The USSR withdrew support to India in the war. China could win over Russia through diplomacy .
Khrushchev refused to deliver the first batch of MiG 21 Fighter aircrafts before the forces of Mao crossed the borders.
Within seven days of this meeting, an attack on India was launched.
On 20th of October China launched a full scale offensive against India. They consolidated in Aksai Chin in the west and penetrated deep into NEFA. After the initial withdrawal, much to the brave fights single handedly put by soldiers like Jaswant Singh Rawat, and Major Shaitan Singh could delay the advancement of the PLA, giving time for the reinforcements of the Indian Army . Chinese troops faced an unexpected set back, retreated and fell in large numbers. The casualty was not estimated, that is another episode..
The unilateral ceasefire was declared by Chou en Lai on 21st November 1962. NEFA was retained without any change in the borders. More than a ceasefire, it has to be seen as a carefully, methodologically planned and well timed pull out. Nehru failed to understand the dynamics of the Chinese communist party in taking a decision to attack India and to pull out. It was a well-planned test fire on the Communist strategy of Khrushchev on the capitalist forces of the US and UK backed regimes. More than the projected claims on allowing the Dalai Lama in, it was a test of ideology with Russia with a war.
Exit of MiG 21 from IAF draws the same political significance. US and India differed on Trade relations, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was In China, Russian Air defence system tested its agility at war with India. The Ukraine War realigned the Communist axis of Russia –China- North Korea again. October 7 raid of Israel again split Europe along Pro US and Russian sides. The threat of Nuclear War is mooted from the nose tip of the US president by a Pakistan General.
MiG 21- Made India Great to the 21st Century – on the path of Self Reliance and self Sustainable Economy.
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